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Statehood is inherently intertwined with the law. The powers of the state and their limits, 
the different organs of the state and the relationship with each other, the relationship between the 
citizens and the state, and the rights of citizens, those are all governed by constitutional law. The 
constitutional model to be adopted, the internal ordering of the state, the relationship between the 
citizenry and the state, and how the constitution addresses the questions of membership, belonging 
and rights are all significant questions in any exercise related to thinking about possible 
constitutional frameworks. These are especially important in the context of exploring options for 
creating a single democratic state in the area of Historic Palestine (Israel and the West Bank and 
Gaza Strip) as part of resolving the Israeli-Arab conflict. 
 Any such thinking about solving the conflict will have to address the many challenges that the 
conflict presents. It is a longstanding conflict which has its roots in the late the nineteenth century 
between two conflicting national movements. One of the movements, Zionism, shares many 
characteristics with settler-colonial movements in its ideologies, narratives and the strategies 
pursued. Indeed, that is how the Palestinians, the native population, experienced and still experience 
the policies and practices of the Zionist movement and later on the state of Israel. As in other 
settler-colonial situations, the current reality reflects conditions of severe inequality between the 
settler population and the native population. This inequality is built into the political system, the 
economy and law, reflecting the privileges that the settler population enjoys in the settler state. In 
addition to the pervasive inequality there are certain events in the history of the conflict that became 
important landmarks because of the intensity of the violence and the profoundness of its impact. 
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Events such as the Nakba came to embody decades of historical injustice. A solution that is based 
on a single state built on the principles of equality and democracy has to address these challenges of 
inequality in addition to the challenges of tackling the injustices of the past and fostering a sense of 
security and partnership for the future.    
What would the possible constitutional frameworks for a single state be? What are the 
merits and demerits of each model? Would these models be able to satisfy the rights and needs of 
citizens of the future state? To guide the discussion and the assessment of the different options, the 
chapter will begin with a discussion of a number of guiding principles against which the different 
models will be assessed. These principles are mainly designed to address the problems under the 
current conditions, the historical injustices, the needs, claims and aspirations of the people living in 
this region. These principles will be discussed in part II. The discussion of the different models will 
start in part III. This part will focus on unitary models, and will discuss three particular models: the 
liberal state which is totally blind to the differences among the different groups amongst the 
population, the bi-national model, and the multicultural model. Part IV will examine the possible 
federal models, mainly purely territorial federalism, and a mix between federalism and 
consociationalism. Part V will be devoted to human rights arrangements. It will assess the role of 
human rights in any future constitutional settlement. Part VI will finish with some concluding 
remarks.  
Guiding Principles 
Constitutional design is not an abstract exercise conducted on a blank slate. While in this 
case it signifies a new beginning, no beginning and no thinking about constitutional design could be 
separated from its context. Constitutional design means thinking about the issues, the problems, the 
questions and the controversies that affect a certain country, and thinking of ways to articulate the 
principles on which the new constitutional order will be built. In our context, these principles are 
  
meant to address the problems and the injustice of the current situation, problems that the two-state 
solution is unlikely to solve, and potential problems that are likely to emerge in the context of a one 
state arrangement. Similarly, the principles are necessary to guarantee fairness and justice and a 
measure of stability for the regime that that is being designed.  
 
Equal Citizenship 
Lack of equality between Palestinians and Israelis is one of the core problems and injustices 
that affect that daily life of people, and reverberates throughout the legal and political system. It 
stems from the colonial outlook and policies implemented by Israel which have their roots in the 
early (pre-state Zionist) thought. If one were to classify the inhabitants of the area between the 
Mediterranean and the river Jordan according to their rights as a matter of law, it would be clear 
that there are a number of hierarchical categories. On the top we can find the Jewish citizens of 
Israel. Those enjoy the full spectrum of rights, and their rights and interests almost automatically 
trump the rights of all the categories below. The second category is the Palestinian citizens in Israel. 
While formal citizenship gives them a measure of civil rights, their nominal citizenship does not 
grant full equality, for according to Israeli law and Zionist thought they do not belong to the 
“nation” that exercises self-determination in Israel. The rights enjoyed by this group do not extend 
to the full spectrum of rights.2 The third category is the Palestinians of East Jerusalem who, 
according to Israeli law, have residency rights but not citizenship rights. Under Israeli law, 
residency is a status that could be easily revoked if the individual lives outside Israeli areas for an 
extended period of time. Next (fourth) are the Palestinians in the West Bank who live under Israeli 
occupation. Israel has ultimate control over the territory with the Palestinian Authority acting as the 
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local agent that runs the day-to-day affairs of the population. Number five is the Gaza Strip, which, 
legally is still under Israeli occupation, and it represents the most severe situation: while the Hamas-
controlled Palestinian Authority rules over the population, the state of siege, prohibition of 
movement of people and goods, and the periodic bouts of violence visited upon the population by 
Israel make the conditions drastically more serious than the West Bank. Finally, the group that is 
most disenfranchised and lacks minimum rights are the Palestinian refugees. Many of the 
Palestinian refugees (those displaced in 1948) live in refugee camps and towns in the West Bank 
and Gaza Strip, but a significant number are concentrated in Jordan, Syria, and Lebanon in addition 
to other countries in the world. A sizable number of these refugees are stateless.  
While the question of inequality is inherently political, these hierarchies were created and 
are maintained by law, mostly Israeli law. This is clear in Israel’s constitutional definition as a 
Jewish state, which designates the Jewish collective as the dominant group of the state and the 
public sphere. It is also clear in a range of laws and policies that affect the rights of Palestinians, 
whether they are in Israel, West Bank and Gaza Strip or in exile.3 The legally sanctioned inequality 
was put on a more firm footing with the enactment in 2018 of Basic Law: Israel - the Nation State 
of the Jewish People. This law, which has a constitutional status, reasserts many of the principles 
that are associated with the definition of the state as a Jewish state. It highlights the notions of self-
determination exclusively for Jews in Israel, the connections between Israel and Jewish 
communities elsewhere, the supremacy of Hebrew as the official language, and the importance of 
Jewish immigration and Jewish settlement. All of these ideas are already constitutional values in 
Israel, as stated repeatedly by Israeli courts. But the fact that Israeli politicians decided to reassert 
their importance in the form of a Basic Law indicates the level of entrenchment of inequality. 
Any solution for the conflict should be based on the idea of equal citizenship for all of these 
categories. Equality in this context could be divided into legal and political equality, and social 
                                                 
3 Masri, Dynamics of Exclusionary Constitutionalism. 
  
equality. Legal and political equality mean that all members of the categories mentioned above 
should be entitled to citizenship as a matter of right, and each citizen is entitled to the same basic 
bundle of rights. Equality should also extend to cultural, linguistic and religious rights such that 
each cultural group will be able to enjoy and preserve its culture. It is important to highlight that 
legal and political equality cannot be achieved without social equality, and it is especially so in a 
situation where there are several categories of people with significant economic and social 
differences. As such, in order to achieve equality, future arrangements should contain significant 
schemes to tackle the sources of inequality. Resources should be allocated with the view of 
eliminating social gaps which would include affirmative action plans. Furthermore, transitional 
justice schemes should include reparations, especially with regard to the losses of the Palestinian 
refugees. Reparations which would include restitution of property would help in addressing the 
current state of economic inequality.   
 
Immigration, Residency and Citizenship Laws and Polices  
Citizenship and immigration laws and policies are essential components of membership in 
the polity, for they control who can enter the polity and the status of individual and sometimes 
groups within it.  For Palestinians, the 1948 ethnic cleansing has been described as the Nakba 
(catastrophe) and it entailed the mass displacement of the majority of Palestinians and the loss of a 
homeland and all of the entitlements that are associated with it - citizenship, land, dwelling etc. On 
the other hand, the policy of creating a Jewish state in Palestine relied on Jewish immigration (in 
addition to expulsion) in order to create a critical mass or a majority which would create its own 
state. Immigration (and demography) was, and still is, vital for the Zionist project. Negotiations, 
contestations and campaigns to increase Jewish immigration and their absorption in Palestine were 
central to the Zionist activities before 1948 and after the creation of Israel. While many of the 
  
immigrants where refugees fleeing atrocities in Europe, for the Zionist leadership those were an 
essential part of the process of building a Jewish majority.4 
The current immigration and citizenship laws and policies are more or less a translation of 
this approach, and are characterized by serious discrimination and racism.5 The various categories 
discussed above are essentially the outcome of the operation of citizenship and residency laws and 
policies that allocate rights differentially. Any constitutional model adopted must address the issue 
of citizenship and immigration with the view of eliminating the current legal sources of inequalities, 
and should also strive to provide an equitable immigration policy for the benefit of the citizenry of 
the future state as well.  
Such a model should eliminate the current immigration regime, and the idea of exclusive 
Jewish immigration, known as “return” or shvout, which was recently emphasized in the 2018 Basic 
Law: Israel - the Nation State of the Jewish People. This idea is not just a matter of technicalities of 
immigration legislation (for at some point during or right after the transformational change that 
would bring about the creation of a single state, all existing legislation should be revised and 
adapted to the new situation) but extends to the level of fundamental principles. The idea of Jewish 
immigration, or “Aliya”, as former Chief Justice of Supreme Court of Israel explained, is not a 
technical term. It is regarded as a fundamental political principle, or as Barak puts it, it is “a social, 
value laden, and national term.”(Toshbeim v. Minister of Interior (2004):para. 23). Accordingly, the 
Law of Return-1950, even though it is not officially a basic law (legislation that has constitutional 
status that is higher than ordinary legislation in the normative hierarchy) it is seen as “one of the 
most important laws in Israel, if not the most important” (Toshbeim v. Minister of Interior 
(2004):733).. Its importance stems from the notion that it  
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is the key to entering the State of Israel, which constitutes a central reflection of the fact that 
Israel is not merely a democratic state, but also a Jewish state; it constitutes “the 
constitutional cornerstone of the character of the State of Israel as the state of the Jewish 
people” (Toshbeim v. Minister of Interior (2004):733). 
 
The Law of Return therefore is not just merely a matter of immigration: it is the main category of 
distinction between Jews and non-Jews (mainly Palestinians); distinction between those who, 
according to Israeli law, have the right to self-determination and the right to a homeland in Israel 
with all of the associated national and collective rights, and those whose presence in the country is 
based on individual rights or status. This distinction is carried from this foundational point 
throughout the legal system and is used to justify discrimination.  
On the other hand, the concept of Jewish “return” should not be confused with the right of 
return of the Palestinian refugees. While the former is based on a political ideology that was 
codified into law and has no equivalent anywhere else in the world, the latter is a well-established 
human right that refugees (and others who are arbitrarily denied the right to access their countries) 
are entitled to under international law.6 The right of return of the Palestinian refugees is essential in 
equalizing the rights and eliminating the current discriminatory hierarchy.  
 
Group Rights 
The population between the river Jordan and the Mediterranean belongs to two main groups: 
Jewish Israelis and Palestinians. While both groups are diverse in their composition (for example, 
Palestinians include Muslims and Christians but almost all are Arabic speakers, Jews include a 
number of subgroups, some of whom speak other languages such as Russian and Amharic, and 
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some sub-groups are not “legally” Jewish but speak Hebrew and embrace Jewish Israeli culture), 
the affiliation as Jewish or Palestinian/Arab is the cardinal division. This division is the main point 
of distinction which decides rights under the current regime, and is the most pronounced in terms of 
identity. It also overlaps with the distinction (discussed below) of settler/indigenous. 
These two groups (and in some cases the sub-groups) have their own distinctive language, 
culture, heritage and religion. These markers are important markers of identity(ies). Today, these 
two groups live more or less separately, even though they inhabit the same area. This separation is 
not between equals. The Jewish-Israeli collective is the dominant group in almost all aspects- 
politically, economically and linguistically: the Jewish group is the one that elects the government,7 
it is the one that controls the economy, and Hebrew is the dominant language of governance and 
trade. Palestinians, however, enjoy some cultural/religious autonomy in the areas of Palestinian 
Authority. Palestinians who live in Israel, while seemingly enjoy some form of cultural autonomy 
in the form of separate religious institutions and courts and a separate education system, these 
institutions are tightly controlled by the government and are designed to benefit the state rather than 
the members of these religious groups. 
Accounting for the diversity of the population is crucial for a stable and just settlement of 
conflicts in countries with deep national, ethnic or religious divisions. The constitutional principles 
and the state institutions should acknowledge the fact that there are two main groups, and these 
groups have different identities that should be accommodated. This recognition and accommodation 
does not and should not mean dominance of one group over the other, or special rights or privileges 
for one group, as is the situation today. The principle of equality should be observed in the design 
and administration of group rights, on the level of the group and the individuals belonging to the 
groups. At the same time, special attention should be given in order to guard against a situation 
                                                 
7 While the Palestinians who are citizens of Israel are entitled to vote in the parliamentary 
elections, their participation does not influence legislation or policy.  
  
where belonging to a certain group becomes the most significant source of rights, rather than 
citizenship or membership in the broader polity.  
 
Historical Redress, Transitional Justice and Transformative Constitutionalism 
Constitutional change in a post-conflict context cannot be a tool to preserve the past. At the 
same time, we cannot imagine a constitution that is totally separated from the conflict, its history, 
its injustices and its underlying causes. The constitution should play a dual role: to anchor and 
facilitate transitional justice measures such as truth telling, reparation, and prosecution.8 The second 
role for the constitution is mainly forward looking: transformation. It should mark a break with the 
past and it is injustices and inequities, and signal the beginning of a new constitutional order that 
aims at transforming the state and society based on a new just vision. Transformational 
constitutionalism, Karl Klare explains, is  
 
a long-term project of constitutional enactment, interpretation, and enforcement committed 
(not in isolation, of course, but in a historical context of conducive political developments) 
to transforming a country's political and social institutions and power relationships in a 
democratic, participatory, and egalitarian direction. Transformative constitutionalism 
connotes an enterprise of inducing large-scale social change through nonviolent political 
processes grounded in law. I have in mind a transformation vast enough to be inadequately 
captured by the phrase 'reform,' but something short of or different from 'revolution' in any 
traditional sense of the word. In the background is an idea of a highly egalitarian, caring, 
multicultural community, governed through participatory, democratic processes in both the 
polity and large portions of what we now call the 'private sphere.'9 
 
Transformation cannot be an initiative that is undertaken solely by the legal system. It is 
essentially a political process with many actors, and the legal system could play an important role. 
                                                 
8 Juan Méndez, “Constitutionalism and Transitional Justice,” in The Oxford Handbook of 
Comparative Constitutional Law, ed. Michel Rosenfeld and András Sajó, (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2012). 
9 Karl Klare, “Legal and Culture Transformative Constitutionalism,” South African Journal on 
Human Rights 14, no. 1 (1998): 146. 
  
This role was articulated in the post-apartheid jurisprudence of the South African Constitutional 
Court which emphasized that the post-apartheid interim Constitution of South Africa,  
 
is not simply some kind of statutory codification of an acceptable or legitimate past. It retains 
from the past only what is defensible and represents a radical and decisive break from that 
part of the past which is unacceptable. It constitutes a decisive break from a culture of 
Apartheid and racism to a constitutionally protected culture of openness and democracy and 
universal human rights for South Africans of all ages, classes and colours. There is a stark 
and dramatic contrast between the past in which South Africans were trapped and the future 
on which the Constitution is premised. ... The relevant provisions of the Constitution must 
therefore be interpreted so as to give effect to the purposes sought to be advanced by their 
enactment (Shabalala and Others v Attorney-General of the Transvaal and Another 1995). 
 
This vision helped transform South Africa, and made its Constitutional Court a leading 
actor especially in the context of social and economic rights, even if this transformation did not go 
far enough in some areas.10 This kind of transformative thinking about the constitution is 
indispensable for a one state model to work effectively, regardless of the model adopted. In our 
context it means a major change in the doctrines, principles, mindsets and practices that have 
informed existing constitutional and legal thinking which have established and entrenched the 
current apartheid realities. It means that constitutional practice should be guided by the principles 
that are at the heart of the thinking about a single state, such as the principles discussed in this 
section.  
Decolonization  
Colonialism, and more specifically settler colonialism, lies at the heart of the conflict 
between Palestinians and Jewish Israelis. The division is not just ethnic/national in its nature, but 
also a division between a settler society that has almost full control over the state, and an 
indigenous society that is resisting the status quo. As in other colonial situations, the colonization 
process was accompanied by widespread processes of elimination of the indigenous population. The 
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uniqueness in the case of Israel is that Israel as a state was formed as a settler-colonial state, and at 
the same time acts as a colonial power in the West Bank under the guise of occupation.  
Patrick Wolfe, a prominent theorist of settler colonialism, identifies its essential feature as 
“the logic of elimination, a sustained institutional tendency to supplant the indigenous population 
which reconciles a range of historical practices that might otherwise seem distinct.”11 This colonial 
process applies to Israel. However, the characterization of Israel and the Zionist movement as 
settler-colonial is not accepted by many Israelis who think of Israel as the culmination of a 
historical and natural right to establish a Jewish state.12 Many writers on the other hand see the 
Zionist project and the formation of the state of Israel as a form of settler-colonialism.13 They 
highlight the intensive immigration from Europe with the intention of building a state exclusively 
for the benefit of the settler society. This approach is also accepted by a number of Israeli 
academics who agree that Israel and the Zionist project have a strong settler-colonial element,14 or 
like Baruch Kimmerling who adopted the settler – native distinction but without using the term 
settler-colonialism.15 Some, like Wolfe, even observe that the Zionist logic of elimination is more 
exclusive than in Australia or the United States.16  
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Since colonialism is one of the significant issues at the heart of the conflict, decolonization 
should be at the center of any solution. The concept of decolonization could have several meanings 
depending on the context, location and epoch, such as decolonization in Asia and Africa in the 
1950s-1970s and the creation of independent states. In our context we need to adopt an approach to 
decolonization that takes into account the particularities of the situation. It does not mean the 
departure of members of the settler society, but rather a political process that addresses the main 
structures and manifestations of colonialism, and the distinctions, inequities and injustices it has 
produced over the past 100 years, with the view of transforming society and the relationships 
between the two major groups into one that is built on equality. It entails, on the part of the settler 
society, the willingness to abandon the colonial privileges and recognition of the past injustices, and 
for the indigenous society the willingness to accept that the settler society, having abandoned it 
colonial privileges, has the legitimate right to exist as an equal partner in the state. The same way 
colonialism affects all aspects of life, decolonization should also address those aspects, and should 
be a central theme in the constitutional design. Decolonization, overlaps with the fours principles 
discussed earlier (equal citizenship, immigration, group rights and transitional justice and 
transformative constitutionalism). In some sense, they are all constituent components that are 
covered by the wider category of decolonization.  
Constitutional Design I: A Unitary State 
A unitary state is one in which state power is centralized- that is, there are no competing 
sources of state power, and the different branches of the state exercise the same level of power in 
the whole territory of the state. Autonomous regions are possible, but they are not seen as 
constituent components of the state. A unitary state could have a number of possible constitutional 
frameworks. 
  
A Liberal, Difference-Blind State 
A neutral state is one that does not adopt any preference for its citizens’ values, preferences 
or principles. It views the citizen first and foremost as an individual, and provides its citizens with 
the full range of liberal rights regardless of their belonging. It adopts a policy of difference-
blindness when it comes to the citizens’ identity whether they are cultural, linguistic, ethnic or 
national. Such a state does not exist in reality. While there are states that adopt a policy of neutrality 
in certain areas such as religion, a state cannot be neutral in areas such as language for practical 
reasons. Rather, what exists in reality are states that try to promote what Charles Taylor calls “the 
politics of universalism”, that is, the promotion of equality of all citizens and avoiding the 
stratification of the citizens into classes.17 This could be seen as the nation building model: the state 
encourages a certain identity, culture, language and political culture.18 This approach applies to 
areas that are seen as “official” or public. The state on the other hand gives the citizens belonging to 
minority ethnocultural groups the liberty of using their language or practicing their culture in the 
private sphere 
It should be noted that what is seen as “universal equality” is in reality not universal, for it 
provides a preference for certain particular cultures. In does promote a hegemonic culture, or as 
Charles Taylor puts it, it is “a particularism masquerading as the universal.”19 France is generally 
adopted as the archetype for this model with its emphasis on French republican values, French 
culture and French language. These are seen as “universal” even if they are particular to the France.  
It does not impose the official language, but at the same time it does not recognize or promote the 
languages of the minorities.  
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Adopting such a model for a new state would raise many difficulties. Under the current 
situation, there is no one hegemonic culture that a clear and substantive majority would support. 
This obstacle, however, could be surmounted by leaving the question of hegemonic culture open 
and where absolutely necessary, such as language, adopting cultural elements of both groups. While 
this will be transformational in the sense that it presents a break with the current situation where 
Jewish Israelis dominate the state, this transformation is of a limited scope because of the model’s 
narrow conception of equality. For even though it is based on equality, and there is much to admire 
in the emphasis on “universal equality” among citizens, this kind of equality assumes uniformity, 
and is contrary to the realities of most societies. This understanding of equality will be in its narrow 
sense only. It will be based on an individualist approach and will not account for diversity. This 
indifference to diversity means eventually that one culture or group, whether through numeric 
preponderance, political power or economic advantage, will eventually become hegemonic. 
The emphasis on equality as uniformity and difference-blindness will also create problems 
when it comes to group rights especially if those rights require some form of accommodation in the 
form of recognition of groups and adjustment to their special interests or needs. Similarly, this 
model will be in tension with transitional justice, for transitional justice in the context of the Israeli-
Arab conflict has to account for identity and difference. But under this model, there are no groups, 
no settler society and indigenous society, but citizens and citizens only. It is likely to be the same 
approach regarding decolonization: for decolonization to work, one should first identify the colonial 
process and the privileges it created, which will be hard to achieve in a model based on uniformity.  
 
The Bi-National Model  
A binational state, in short, is one associated with two national groups. Those who belong 
the relevant national groups will be able to enjoy individual and national rights, and their right to be 
  
represented in state institutions will be constitutionally protected.20 The origins of this approach 
could be traced back to the Brit Shalom group which was later on recreated as Ihud, and was active 
among the Jewish immigrants in Palestine in the 1920s-1940s. The impetus behind this group –
which was small and politically marginal- was their understanding that the Palestinians will never 
agree to a Jewish state in their land since that means that they will not be able to exercise their right 
to self-determination. The group believed that Jews had “historical” rights over Palestine while the 
Palestinian Arabs had “natural rights”. To reconcile those rights they proposed binationalism: the 
state would be composed of two nationalities (or nations), Jews and Arabs, and both groups would 
have equal political rights regardless of majority or minority status.21 
But binationalism is to a large extent an abstract and vague concept that could apply to a 
number of models. To avoid abstractions, the discussion here focuses on practicalities, and 
identifies four levels of binationalism.  
  
Declarative Bi-nationalism 
Bi-nationalism could be expressed on a declarative level as recognition by the state, 
through its constitution or other legal instruments, of the fact the majority of the citizens belong to 
two national or ethnic groups. If such a clause is kept at the declarative level and not given 
normative weight, then it has the potential of satisfying the aspirations of both groups. It provides 
recognition without providing special rights or privileges as a result of this recognition. Such a 
clause would be compatible with the principle of equal citizenship, and will not necessarily have 
implications for immigration policy. Group rights, may prove to be more complicated, depending 
on the kind of rights claimed and the level of involvement of the state. If issues such as religion, 
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language and culture are seen as a matter of private preference only, the state will not promote any 
aspect of those, but at the same time would not interfere.  
Bi-nationalism as Cultural Autonomy and Official Adoption of Symbols 
This level complements the declarative level with active measures to give expression to 
group preferences. The recognition of the two groups will extend to granting some form of cultural 
autonomy in some areas, such as religion, cultural institutions, and recognition of the equal status of 
both languages. Additionally, the recognition will extend to the symbols of the state (flag, anthem, 
emblem), and those will combine elements representing both groups.  
Recognition and cultural autonomy could take different forms, and those will determine its 
compatibility with the principles set out in the earlier section. If both groups are given exclusive 
jurisdiction on their cultural affairs, then a number of problems might arise. First, this arrangement 
will mean that all citizens have to belong to one of the groups. This raises difficulties regarding 
those who do not belong, or do not want to belong to either group. Second, will a cultural institution 
have the power to refuse service for or participation of a citizen just because she does not belong to 
the designated group? Third, this emphasis on strict group differentiation might be manipulated to 
provide rights or services in a discriminatory manner to different groups, as is the situation today in 
religious services in Israel. A fourth problem that would arise is the problem of accountability and 
state control: to whom will those autonomous institutions be accountable? What is the role of the 
state in their regulation?  
 
Bi-nationalism and Immigration 
The third level brings immigration and citizenship policy into the realm of bi-nationalism. 
Since it was enacted in 1950, the Law of Return was justified and rationalized based on the right to 
self-determination, namely that a state where a specific group exercises self-determination should 
allow members of that group the right to immigrate to it and become citizens. As such, Jews, as a 
  
national group, should be allowed to immigrate and join their co-nationalists in their national 
home.22 If this logic is applied to bi-nationalism then the state has to allow the immigration of 
members of both groups, or at least facilitate it significantly. This means the preservation of the 
Law of Return, or some variation of it. This component of bi-nationalism was at the heart of the bi-
national view promoted by Brit Shalom/Ihud. The group believed that there should be numerical 
parity between Palestinians and Jews in Palestine, and part of their plan was to allow unlimited 
Jewish immigration until this numerical parity is achieved.23 This requirement might prove to be 
problematic on a number of levels.  
 
Bi-nationalism and Governance: Consciationism  
The principle of consociational democracy proposed by Arend Lijphart is the most relevant 
model of sharing power within the state between multiple ethnic groups. Lijphart’s model aims to 
share, decentralize and limit state power. The model has a number of elements. First is power 
sharing on the executive level. Second, Lijphart advocates for proportional representation of the 
groups in parliament and in the main institutions of the state such as the civil services, judiciary, the 
police force and the army. The third element is mutual veto powers on matters of vital interests. 
This is especially important for minorities whose representation is not strong enough. The fourth 
element is segmental autonomy, either in the form of federalism or group autonomy in areas linked 
closely to ethnic identity.24  
Bi-nationalism on the level of governance is indeed a form of consciationalism where the 
power is shared between the two groups. There is no one way to implement this system but the 
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principles listed above which could be implemented in a number of ways. In our context, this could 
be in the form of a bi-cameral parliament, a cabinet composed of equal number of individuals 
belonging to both groups, quota systems in the public service and other state offices, and veto rights 
on vital interests. This seems to be the thrust of the proposal by Brit Shalom/Ihud. One of the main 
components of their proposal included a constituent assembly to draw up a constitution and a 
legislative assembly which would include equal number of Palestinians and Jews.25 This was at a 
time when Palestinians out-numbered Jews two to one, though the plan included massive Jewish 
immigration to bring about numerical parity too. Parity would also be maintained at the level of the 
executive control through an executive council. The proposal also spoke of a Jewish Council and a 
corresponding Arab Council which would be responsible for the cultural affairs for each community 
such as education.  
Bi-nationalism: Pitfalls and Potential 
The first problem of bi-nationalism in the context of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is group 
definition. Two questions arise here: who are the two nations in the bi-national? The second 
question is: who is included in the group and who is going to decide on that? As for the first 
question, it is not clear whether the non-Palestinian group is Jewish (anyone who is religiously or 
culturally Jewish) or Israeli. While there is overlap between the two categories, there is definitely a 
big difference. Even though sociologically one can identify that an Israeli collective has emerged in 
the past 70 year that has distinctive features from Jews elsewhere, Israel has refused to 
acknowledge this fact. Officially and legally, there is no such thing as an Israeli nation, and the only 
nation in Israel is the Jewish nation (Tamarin v. The State of Israel 1972). 
On the conceptual level, stating that all Jews have a right to self-determination and a stake in 
the state flies in the face of contemporary practices which emphasize citizenship and not religious 
or ethnic belonging. On a practical level, especially if this arrangement is accompanied with 
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immigration rights similar to the ones adopted today, it means that millions whose only link is 
religious will be able to immigrate. Equally problematic is the issue of who would be included in 
the groups, or who is a Jew/Israeli, and who is a Palestinian. The question of “who is a Jews” has 
been a serious constitutional and political question in Israel. The question of who is Palestinian may 
prove to be easier to answer: anybody who originates from the area of historic Palestine is 
Palestinian. But yet there are some who could not be included in this category, and could be seen as 
Palestinian by association, such as political figures who played important roles in Palestinian 
politics. Adopting a bi-national model means that these two categories need to be legally defined, 
and the eligibility to participate in politics and access to some services will rest on the whether the 
individual belongs to one or the other.  
Similarly, this emphasis on group belonging in the power-sharing mechanisms assumes that 
all citizens belong to these two groups. But what about those who do not fit the definition? This 
emphasis might lead to absurd outcomes that undermine the principles of equality and citizenship. 
A case in point here is Bosnia Herzegovina and the decision of the European Court of Human 
Rights in the Sejdic and Finici case. As part of the Dayton Agreement, the Preamble to the 
Constitution of Bosnia Herzegovina describes Bosniacs, Croats and Serbs as “constituent peoples”. 
The presidency and all legislatures (on the federal level and state level) are shared with 
representatives from each group. Sejdic, who is of Roma origin, and Finci, who is of Jewish origin, 
wanted to stand for elections, but since they do not fit any of the three “constituent peoples”, they 
were ineligible. The Court ruled that this was a violation to their right to participate in free elections 
and their right to be protected from discrimination (Sejdic and Finici v. Bosnia Herzegovina 2009). 
The other side of the coin here is the problem of compelled association: those who do not want to 
  
be part of any group: for them, in order to participate in politics, they will be compelled to associate 
with one of the two groups.26  
The second problem is that emphasis on the national/ethnic belonging in politics in this 
manner is more conducive to highlighting what divides the polity rather than what unites it. 
Political power channeled through the ethnic/national affiliation makes membership in the 
communal group the source of political power and rights, rather than citizenship and membership in 
the state. This might lead to both groups adopting initiatives to develop and highlight the particular 
identity in a manner which is not necessarily constructive.  
In addition to these particular concerns in our context, there are a number of salient critiques 
of the model in the academic literature. Critics argue that consociationalism tends to strengthen the 
elites of the national or ethnic groups, because its success relies on the elites’ ability to demonstrate 
that they can enforce the consociational arrangements among their respective groups. Critics also 
observe that consociationalism limits competition among elites over issues of public concern and 
policy questions, which in turns produces weak and undemocratic government. Another critique is 
that consociationalism hinders politics of economic distribution especially that its focus is on 
cultural/ethnic recognition and ignores social class. Questions of allocation of resources can easily 
escalate into disputes between the two groups, especially in situations of economic disparity as in 
our case. Additionally, since consociationalism requires many actors/political parties to be in power 
in the form of a broad ruling coalition, the official opposition tends to be small and very weak.  
Consociationalism effectively eliminates or significantly weakens official opposition which is 
essential for the functioning of a democracy. This, according to critics of consociationalism, 
weakens democracy.27  
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Consociationalism is also likely to violate some of the principles mentioned in part II. Most 
significantly, it could potentially violate the principle of equal citizenship especially if implemented 
in the manner advocated by Ihud that speaks of an equally divided legislature. While the numerical 
composition of the population of a bi-national state is hard to assess at this point, and may well be 
close to parity, it is hard to guarantee that it will stay the same, and if this happens, such a 
legislature will give more power to the group that is a minority. This could be dangerous in 
situations where, for example, the ethnic/national divide also overlaps with socio-economic divide. 
Similarly, because of the general weakness and instability of the state under this model, it would be 
hard to implement transitional justice initiatives and changes that are conducive to decolonization.  
Despite these critiques and potential problems, some of the ideas that consocialtionalism 
promotes could be helpful without emphasizing the ethnic/national dimension. The adoption of a 
parliamentary system, proportionate representation (of parties) in parliament, recognition of the 
ethnic/national groups, language rights, and some form of cultural autonomy are all ideas that could 
be used and implemented without necessarily adopting some of the problematic aspects of 
consociationalism. This way, power is shared and diffused without necessarily strengthening 
sectarianism. 
 
A Multicultural State  
Principles 
A multicultural state is one that could potentially combine many of the benefits of a bi-
national model and at the same time avoid the potential risks. There is no one universally agreed 
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upon definition of multiculturalism, for there are a number of models that are practiced in different 
ways.28 The definition that Will Kymilcka -one of the leading theorists of multiculturalism- adopts 
could help clarify the concept. Kymlicka sees multiculturalism as   
 
the view that states should not only uphold the familiar set of common civil, political, and 
social rights of citizenship that are protected in all constitutional liberal democracies, but 
also adopt various group-specific rights or policies that are intended to recognize and 
accommodate the distinctive identities and aspirations of ethnocultural groups.29 
 
Kymlicka identifies three principles that are common for struggles to achieving 
multiculturalism.30 The first one is the idea that the state belongs to all citizens equally. The second 
principle involves the state according “recognition and accommodation to the history, language, and 
culture of non-dominant groups, as it does to dominant groups”. The third principle is related to 
past injustices: “a multicultural state acknowledges the historic injustice that was done to 
minority/non-dominant groups by these policies of assimilation and exclusion, and manifests a 
willingness to offer some sort of remedy or rectification for them.”31 These principles could provide 
good guidelines that could help devise a model that maintains group recognition without 
entrenching group belonging and making it the main marker of politics. 
Equality and Cultural Autonomy 
The starting point of such a model is equality. In our context, in addition to this foundational 
level of relationship, the state should recognize that citizens belong to two main dominant groups, 
Palestinians and Jewish Israelis, with different languages, culture and history, and should give them 
a measure of cultural autonomy. This recognition includes recognition of Arabic and Hebrew as 
official languages of equal status, and recognition of the right of citizens to receive services from 
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and communicate with the state in both languages. Also, special arrangements should be adopted to 
allow for the use of either language in government department (central and local), Parliament, and 
the courts. Similarly, the state should adopt a policy of bilingualism and encouraging (and in cases 
of critical services or monopolistic companies, mandating) the use of both languages. Both 
languages should be taught in all schools, whether public or private.  
Cultural autonomy is commonly understood as allowing members of a distinct group to 
manage matters that are related to cultural affiliation such as language, education, cultural and 
artistic production and religious institutions. The state is a major player in these areas, and its 
policies should, as much as possible, leave the decisions on these cultural issues in the hands of the 
group as recognition of the distinctiveness of cultures. At the same time, cultural autonomy should 
be designed in a manner that highlights equality, diversity, and openness, and not adversity and 
difference.  
A number of guiding principles could be adopted to achieve these goals. A major principle 
is related to group definition and membership. Cultural autonomy should be designed in a manner 
that avoids the problem of group definition, and in our context, where the question of who is 
Jewish-Israeli and who is Palestinian seems to be complicated and could potentially lead to many 
disagreements, the best marker that could be used is language. This way we can avoid the thorny 
question of group definition and membership and still maintain group recognition in a manner that 
is significant for the groups involved. As such, in all areas and institutions of cultural autonomy -
except for religion- the autonomous institutions should first and foremost be based on language. 
And this way, the membership in the group will be based on self-identification and preference and 
not, as it is today in Israel, based on religious criteria or compelled identification.  
Other principles could be adopted to guarantee equality and openness such as accountability. 
Government departments that provide cultural services should be accountable to the public as a 
whole, and not just the particular community they serve. They should be committed to the 
  
principles of equality and diversity. They should not discriminate against individuals in the 
provision of service even if they are not deemed to belong to the linguistic group they are intended 
to serve. Similarly, other administrative law norms that guarantee fairness and accountability should 
apply. 
It should be highlighted that equality in the context of a multicultural state in historic 
Palestine cannot be abstract. It should be informed by decolonization: that the new constitutional 
framework is a way to decolonize the state apparatus and address the wrongs of the past. It should 
be clear that this conception of equality aims to remove the privileges of the settler society rather 
than recreate them or rename them. It should also support and facilitate measures of transitional 
justice, for equality cannot be achieved without addressing the injustices of the past.  
 
Multiculturalism and Democratic Governance 
Multiculturalism does not provide specific guidelines about constitutional arrangements 
beyond the main principles discussed above. One can use these principles, and borrow from some 
of the ideas discussed under consciationism, to provide a framework that will help reflect the 
diversity of the population in the governing bodies and guarantee that no one group can abuse 
power in a manner that affects that rights of the other group, while maintaining equal citizenship as 
the founding principle of the constitutional order.  
The starting point should be constitutional entrenchment of the principles that are at the 
heart of multiculturalism such as equality, bilingualism, recognition and group rights, commitment 
to diversity and acknowledgment of historical injustice. Constitutional amendments changing such 
principles should be possible with a large majority vote only. The Constitution of South Africa for 
example, provides that the principles of democracy, human dignity, non-racialism and non-sexism 
could only be amended with the support of 75% of members of Parliament and the support of 6 
  
provinces out of 9. These principles should not just be declarative in nature but should also be seen 
as constitutional principles that legislation should observe and be compatible with.  
Similarly, the system of governance could be designed in a manner that is more in line with 
the general principles of multiculturalism. A parliamentary system is preferable to a presidential 
system because of its more collaborative nature. While a first past the post voting system (where the 
country is divided into regions, and the candidate with the highest number of votes wins) would 
potentially provide a result representative of the population because of the current state of 
segregation, it is not the most desirable one. A mix between a proportionate representation voting 
system where the whole country is seen as one electoral district, and a number of relatively large 
electoral districts would probably be a better way to guarantee adequate representation and at the 
same time provide candidates from different backgrounds with incentives to cooperate. Such 
arrangements can guarantee that parliament is representative of the general population, and that the 
cabinet will also have a significant representation of both groups without having to specify quotas 
in the constitution. 
A multicultural system seems to be the one that is most compatible with principles outlined 
in part II. It guarantees equality both for individuals and groups, provides a significant measure of 
recognition of group identity, allows significant cultural autonomy, but at the same time maintains 
an emphasis on the idea that the main relationship between the individual and the state is that of 
citizenship and not ethnic/religious background. The ideas of transitional justice and decolonization 
could fit into this model given its emphasis on acknowledging historical injustice.  
While multiculturalism seems to be a satisfactory model that could address many of the 
challenges in our context, one should also be aware of the critiques levelled against it. Two 
critiques are especially important. First, critics argue that the emphasis on culture and identity 
  
diverts attention from social and economic justice and undermines class solidarity.32 Second is the 
question of the vulnerable internal minorities, or minorities within minorities. The emphasis on the 
protection of equality of group identity might worsen existing inequalities within the group.33 Sub-
groups such as women, sexual minorities and religious dissidents might be adversely affected by 
members of their own group. These critiques are indeed significant, but they could also be 
addressed using other tools. 
Constitutional Design II: A Federal State 
Federalism: Principles and Rationale  
While there is no one universally agreed upon definition of federalism, a useful definition 
that captures the essence of many federal arrangements is William Riker’s. Riker sees a constitution 
as federal  
 
if (1) two levels of government rule the same land and people, (2) each level has at least one 
area of action in which it is autonomous, and (3) there is some guarantee (even though merely 
a statement in the constitution) of the autonomy of each government in its own sphere.34 
 
Essentially, the powers of the state are divided between the central or federal government and the 
regional or state government. The division of powers varies from one country to another depending 
on the history and the needs of each state. Some, like Switzerland are very highly decentralized, and 
the Cantons (the regional unit in Switzerland) enjoy a wide range of powers many of them are 
exclusive. The Cantons are so central, that the preamble of the Federal Constitution of the Swiss 
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Confederation names the Cantons, in addition to the people, as the “authors” of the Constitution. 
Other countries, such as Germany, are more centralized even within a federal framework.   
Supporters of federalism argue that it bolsters democracy, for it gives the local population 
more voice in public affairs through the tiered government system. It also allows more political 
participation, especially that of small communities. Similarly, the proximity between the citizens 
and the local decision makers means more responsive government. Supporters also argue that the 
division of state power between two levels of government limits this power and contributes to 
protecting liberties. Some theorists highlight the freedom of movement and choice of residence 
within a federal state, which makes it easier for people to move to like-minded communities.35 
 
Federalism Implemented: Possible Scenarios 
The overwhelming majority of federal states use territory as the basis of federalism. The 
exceptions, mainly Belgium and Bosnia and Herzegovina combine the territorial dimension with a 
communal (ethnic/national) dimension. Territorial federalism is based on territory, and the region or 
the state or the province has powers that are distinct and independent from the federal government. 
The division of power is usually done through the constitution. In situations where the constituent 
states are not pre-existing political units with defined borders, the most important question is the 
question of internal borders. In post-conflict federalism the territorial units are designed in a manner 
to give national minorities a majority in their own regions.36 This, it is thought, will dampen the 
secessionist sentiments of minorities, will provide a measure of control and participation at least on 
                                                 
35 Sujit Choudhry and Nathan Hume, “Federalism, Devolution and Secession: From Classical 
to Post-conflict Federalism,” in Comparative Constitutional Law, ed. Tom Ginsburg and 
Rosalind Dixon, (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2011); Daniel Halberstam, “Federalism: 
Theory, Policy, Law,” in The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Constitutional Law, ed. 
Michel Rosenfeld and András Sajó, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012). 
36 Choudhry and Hume, “Federalism, Devolution and Secession.” 
  
the local level, provide regional jurisdiction over education, language and other cultural aspects, 
and will address some of the demands of the national groups.  
In our case, one approach would be to adopt the 1967 line which will create two territories 
where each group –Palestinians and Israeli Jews- will form a clear majority. It is also possible to 
make some amendments to the line to account for major population centers that belong to the other 
group. Another option would be to adopt a larger number of units that will have significantly 
smaller territories. This will allow for a serious measure of self-rule for the residents of the units, 
and given the existing state of segregation, those units are likely to be homogenous with the 
exception of some highly mixed areas such as parts of Haifa, Yaffa, and Jerusalem.  
Another important question is the powers of the territorial units. In post-conflict federalism, 
it seems that providing regional control of powers related to language, religious services, education, 
and other cultural aspects would satisfy the aspirations of the particular group living in that area. As 
opposed to other areas where questions of natural resources and their division arise (such as oil, gas, 
minerals) the cultural aspects are the most important aspects in our context. All other state functions 
and powers would be controlled by the federal state.   
The other model of federalism is one that combines territorialism with consciationalism 
based on national/ethnic or linguistic dimensions. Belgium and Bosnia Herzegovina are the prime 
examples. Bosnia and Herzegovina is divided into two federal “entities”: Republika Sparska and the 
Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The federal legislature is composed of two chambers with 
quotas for the constituent peoples (Bosnians, Serbs and Croats). The federal presidency is a joint 
presidency with the three peoples represented. The federal government has powers in limited areas 
related to international relations, trade, customs, immigration and monetary policy. All other 
functions and powers are retained by the “entities”.  
The Belgian model is equally complicated. Belgium, as Article 1 of its constitution states, 
“is composed of Communities and Regions.” There are three Regions: Flanders (mostly Dutch-
  
speaking), Wallonia (mostly French-speaking) and the mixed district of Brussels. There are three 
recognized Communities, the French, Flemish and the German-speaking Community. The 
Communities have powers in functional areas that are of cultural concern for the linguistic groups, 
and what is known as “person-related matters” which include certain aspects of healthcare, family 
policy, education. The competence of the Communities, however, is territorially defined by the 
Regions. In Brussels, each Community is competent with regards to members of its linguistic 
group. The Regions have powers in economic area mainly. The Communities and the Regions have 
their own elected parliament. On the federal level, Belgium has a bi-cameral Parliament. The 
Constitution provides more seats for the Dutch speaking population than the French-speaking 
population, although linguistic parity is maintained at the Federal Council of Ministers. The 
Constitution requires a significant majority of two-thirds and a majority of each linguistic group for 
changing the current arrangements.37  
A federal system that combines territorialism with communal belonging would be 
something along the lines of Belgium or Bosnia Herzegovina: it would add a layer of 
consociationalism to the federal structure. The powers given to the states or regions will be a matter 
to be decided, and a number of approaches could be taken. But since our concern here is with the 
cultural aspects of group rights of national and linguistic groups, the states or the regions will have 
control over rights and services related to culture. Cultural autonomy (education, religion, language, 
etc), therefore, would be on the regional level. The region or the state would adopt policies and 
administer the cultural institutions. In addition, other powers could be given to the regions or states 
in the areas of services such as health, social security, housing and other fields that deal with the 
particular needs of the local population. 
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On the federal level, a number of options could be adopted. In the 1940s, Ihud proposed a 
federal structure with a federal parliament and federal executive based on parity.38 They also 
proposed an Arab Council and Jewish Council for cultural affairs, and smaller administrative units 
(counties). In some sense, the proposal by Ihud resembles, to a large extent, the Belgian model in 
that it combines federalism with consociationalism.  
 
Federalism: Promises and Risks  
Many critics argue that the promises of post-conflict federalism are exaggerated. Some 
even suggest that federalism in this context is likely to exacerbate conflict and not solve it. They 
contend that the model is unstable, and is more likely to reinforce conflict between identities. 
Simple policy questions will be recast as conflicts or tensions between national groups. 
Additionally, the fact that the different groups are in control of different regions –even if partial and 
within the confines of federalism- means that they can use the resources available and institutional 
tools for pushing for greater autonomy.39 Another problem which is related to instability is the 
borders between the states or regions. On the one hand, drawing the boarder in order to create 
regional national or ethnic minorities is one of the rationales for adopting a federal model. On the 
other hand, studies show that borders that are designed to create a homogenous population are 
unstable.40 Some suggest that creating heterogeneous territorial units is more likely to force the 
different groups to cooperate. Economic equality is another major issue that should be flagged. 
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Several studies show that there is a correlation between income inequality and federalism.41 
Federalism, and decentralization in general, tend to preserve the economic status quo.42 
All of these critiques are relevant if a federal model is adopted. It is possible to imagine 
states or provinces using resources in a manner that disproportionately benefits the national 
majority in their areas, or in a manner that is designed to achieve goals that are contrary to the goals 
of the federal state or the spirit of the political settlement. For example states could act to strengthen 
the bond between the individuals and their local state at the expense of the bond with the federal 
state. Similarly, the question of economic redistribution will be a thorny one especially that the 
Palestinian-majority states/regions will be economically weaker given the current economic 
realities. For a federal model to work in our context, the federal state should have ultimate say in 
economic matters including the ability to overturn the policies and legislation of the states. Other 
risks include the fact that it will be impossible to create regions that are homogenous. There will 
always be a minority. Similarly, language presents a serious challenge: would the regions be 
allowed to choose one language for administration and service provision? In addition to these 
particular challenges that federalism would present, almost all of the challenges and risks discussed 
under bi-nationalism are relevant when we consider federalism.  
Given the nature of federalism and the risks in this model, there are important questions 
related to compatibility of the model with the principles discussed in part II of the chapter. While in 
theory the model could be accompanied by assurances regarding equality, comparative studies show 
its weakness when it comes to redistribution and inequality. Similarly, even though it satisfies the 
requirements related to group rights, it runs the risk of putting too much emphasis on group identity 
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and political power as a group in a manner that might intensify tensions. The tendency to preserve 
the status quo that comparative studies associate with federalism could also cast some doubt about 
the ability of the state to implement transitional justice schemes or make changes in the context of 
decolonization.  
Human Rights 
The protection of human rights through an enforceable constitutional bills of rights has 
become an important feature of peaceful settlement of protracted ethnic/national conflict since the 
1990s.43 The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa is a good example. The Constitution of 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, which was adopted as an annex to the Dayton Agreement, integrated the 
European Convention on Human Rights and its protocols as part of the Constitution. The European 
Convention on Human Rights also played a role in the Good Friday Agreements in Northern 
Ireland.  
One of the main debates in constitutional law and constitutional theory is on judicially 
enforceable bills of rights that would give the judiciary the power to review legislation. Judicial 
review of legislation raises a number of problems. The rationale behind judicial review is that the 
legislature, as an organ of the state created and bound by the constitution, acts within its powers 
only when its actions do not violate the principles of the constitution including the bill of rights. 
The problem arises when the legislative body is democratically elected. Here the conflict is between 
democracy represented by the democratically elected parliament, and the idea of constitutionalism- 
the idea that powers of the state are limited by the constitution.  
This debate has been one of the central debates in constitutional law, especially Anglo-
American constitutional thought.44 While cogent arguments are presented by both sides, the main 
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question that concerns us here is the possible role that a bill of rights could play in the one state 
model, and the desirability of such an approach. Some of the arguments in the debate on judicial 
review could be helpful. One of the most spirited opponents of judicial review is the constitutional 
theorist Jeremy Waldron. Waldron argues that judicial review is illegitimate from a democratic 
point of view, and that democratically elected legislatures are better suited to protect rights. His 
argument, however, is qualified: it is conditional upon satisfying a number of assumptions. 
Waldron’s assumptions are 
 
(1)democratic institutions in reasonably good working order, including a representative 
legislature elected on the basis of universal adult suffrage; (2) a set of judicial institutions, 
again in reasonably good order, set up on a nonrepresentative basis to hear individual lawsuits, 
settle disputes, and uphold the rule of law; (3) a commitment on the part of most members of 
the society and most of its officials to the idea of individual and minority rights; and (4) 
persisting, substantial, and good faith disagreement about rights (i.e., about what the 
commitment to rights actually amounts to and what its implications are) among the member 
of the society who are committed to the idea of rights.45 
 
While the aspiration is to satisfy all these criteria, it will be hard to anticipate whether this will be 
achieved especially in the transitional period. In this case, even according to the strongest 
arguments against judicial review, a bill of rights is necessary.  
Tom Ginsburg advances the theory that bills of rights serve as a form of political insurance 
mechanisms in the context of transition to democracy.46 Hegemonic groups or parties who 
anticipate losing their control over the political system as a result of democratic redistribution of 
political power are interested in being able to access a forum where they can challenge the 
legislature. In our context, where we have two large groups, where it is not entirely clear which 
group will constitute a majority in the electoral sense (although it is expected that the number of 
Palestinians will increase if a significant number of refugees decide to return), this insurance model 
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of judicial review could be helpful for both parties. In constitutional negotiations between the 
groups, each group will highlight and insist on constitutional protection of the interests that are of 
utmost interest for them.  
One principle that should be given prominent status in the bill of rights is equality. Equality 
is the main guiding principle for any settlement based on a single state (regardless of the model 
adopted). In this context, the South African constitution provides a good example to follow: 
equality is mentioned in the preamble, is mentioned in section 1 which could only be amended with 
a majority of 75% of members of Parliament, and is also protected as part of the bill of rights. 
Equality should also be understood in the context of the conflict. The approach to equality should 
be one that is informed by decolonization and one that would allow for and even promote 
transitional justice and affirmative action. It should, for example, allow and facilitate measures such 
as land restitution and reparations.  
Constitutional protection should not be limited to civil and political rights only. Social and 
economic rights should also be protected constitutionally. In a reality of deep social and economic 
inequality, the protection of social and economic rights is especially important to guarantee equality 
and the ability to participate in politics and facilitate redistributive projects. Beyond these 
fundamental ideas about importance of social and economic rights, pragmatic factors also militate 
in favor of providing protection for such rights: the weaker (and more numerous) citizens will have 
an interest in the success of such a settlement.  
Epilogue 
The different models examined in this chapter show that the “one state solution” is not 
necessarily one concrete idea. Different models could fit under this category, and the model’s 
efficacy, potential, risks and pitfalls depend to a very large extent on the details. As we saw, some 
models are more desirable and more amenable to addressing the important challenges, and others 
  
may end up recreating similar problems and even introducing new ones. The primary conclusion is 
that a number of models exit that could be described as democratic, and each model has it promises 
and risks. The hard task here is the decision which option to adopt. It is therefore very important, as 
a starting point for thinking about constitutional design, to have a clear understanding of the 
problems and challenges that need to be addressed, as well as a clear vision of future objectives to 
be achieved by the constitution. While some of these challenges and objectives were discussed in 
the first part of this chapter, these are inevitably intertwined with social, political, historical and 
economic questions discussed in this book. The constitutional model should not be seen as an end, 
but rather a means to address challenges and achieve social and political ends.  
The harder questions, therefore, are not the questions of what is legally desirable or what 
are the best practices in relation to constitutional design, but rather questions that go to the core of 
the political project; questions which will dictate whether the constitution facilitates the political 
project or hinders it. A constitution may include many clauses dealing with democracy, human 
dignity, diversity and human rights and other concepts which sound very desirable when put on 
paper and discussed by jurists. But these ideas and concepts should go beyond debates among 
lawyers and elites and should also become the local currency of the population, for this is the 
ultimate test for its success. For this to happen the population should be able to see that the 
constitution is addressing its concerns and facilitating its political project. 
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